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Abstract
This paper studies a class of social welfare relations (SWRs) on the set of inﬁ-
nite utility streams. In particular, we examine the SWRs satisfying Q-Anonymity,
an impartiality axiom stronger than Finite Anonymity, as well as Strong Pareto
and a certain equity axiom. First, we characterize the extension of the generalized
Lorenz SWR by combining Q-Anonymity with Strong Pareto and Pigou-Dalton
Equity. Second, we replace Pigou-Dalton Equity with Hammond Equity for char-
acterizing the extended leximin SWR. Third, we give an alternative characteriza-
tion of the extended utilitarian SWR by substituting Incremental Equity for Pigou-
Dalton Equity.
Keywords: Q-Anonymity, Intergenerational equity, Generalized Lorenz criterion,
Leximin principle, Utilitarianism, Simpliﬁed criterion
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1 Introduction
In exploring a social welfare relation (SWR) on inﬁnite utility streams, Strong Pareto
and Finite Anonymity are usually employed as basic principles.1 These axioms lead
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1See, for example, the seminal work by Diamond (1965).
1us to the inﬁnite-horizon variant of Suppes (1966) and Sen’s (1970) grading principle
(Svensson 1980; Asheim et al. 2001). The Suppes-Sen grading principle formalizes a
quite intuitive but fairly weak value judgment. To establish further evaluation criteria
beyond the Suppes-Sen grading principle, recent contributions in the literature propose
and characterize (in terms of a subrelation) several plausible SWRs that satisfy certain
desirable properties in addition to Strong Pareto and Finite Anonymity. Basu and Mitra
(2007) characterize the utilitarian SWR by adding the informational invariance axiom
called Partial Unit Comparability. In Asheim and Tungodden (2004), they impose
the equity axiom called Hammond Equity and characterize the two versions of leximin
principlewithoneoftwoalternativepreference-continuityaxiomsaswellasHammond
Equity. The weaker equity axiom, which we call Pigou-Dalton Equity, is examined by
Bossert et al. (2007). They characterize the generalized Lorenz criterion with Pigou-
Dalton Equity and the leximin principle with Hammond Equity.2
Instead of adding auxiliary axioms, Mitra and Basu (2007) strengthen a notion of
anonymity beyond Finite Anonymity in a strongly Paretian SWR.3 They propose the
extended anonymity, called Q-Anonymity, that is deﬁned by a group of cyclic permuta-
tions which contains all ﬁnite permutations. While it is well-known that the anonymity
axiom deﬁned by all possible permutations comes in conﬂict with Strong Pareto (van
Liedekerke 1995; Lauwers 1997a), Mitra and Basu show that any (and only) group(s)
of cyclic permutations can deﬁne the anonymity axiom consistent with a strongly Pare-
tian SWR. Using Q-Anonymity and Strong Pareto, Banerjee (2006a) characterizes the
extended Suppes-Sen grading principle. Furthermore, he also characterizes the ex-
tended utilitarian SWR, called Q-utilitarian SWR, by strengthening Finite Anonymity
to Q-Anonymity (with a certain restriction) in the list of the axioms in Basu and Mitra’s
(2007) characterization of the utilitarian SWR.
The principal task of this paper is to examine whether Q-Anonymity is consistent
with a strongly Paretian and equitable SWR. The results obtained in this paper are
positive. We deﬁne the extensions of the generalized Lorenz and the leximin SWRs,
called Q-generalized Lorenz criterion and Q-leximin principle, in the same way as
Mitra and Basu (2007) and Banerjee (2006a) have done for the Suppes-Sen grading
principle. Then, we show that each of the Q-generalized Lorenz criterion and the Q-
leximin principle is well-deﬁned as a SWR and that the former is characterized in terms
of Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity and Pigou-Dalton Equity and the latter by replacing
Pigou-Dalton Equity with Hammond Equity. In this paper, we also provide a new char-
acterization of the Q-utilitarian SWR by using the equity axiom called Incremental
2The logical relationship among the two versions of the leximin principle characterized by Asheim and
Tungodden (2004) and the leximin principle in Bossert et al. (2007) is the same as the one among the
catching-up and the overtaking SWRs and the utilitarian SWR in Basu and Mitra (2007).
3See also Lauwers (1997b; 2006) and Fleurbaey and Michel (2003).
2Equity. This characterization result is established without the restriction employed by
Banerjee (2006a) on the permissible permutations considered in Q-Anonymity. We
show that the Q-utilitarian SWR is well-deﬁned even without Banerjee’s restriction on
the permissible permutations. The direct counterpart of Banerjee’s (2006a) characteri-
zation result is also established.
The next section introduces notation and deﬁnitions. Section 3 presents axioms
and establishes the characterizations of the Q-generalized Lorenz criterion and the Q-
leximin principle. Section 4 provides two characterizations of the Q-utilitarian SWR.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix.
2 Notation and deﬁnitions
Let R (resp. R++) be the set of all (resp. all positive) real numbers and N the set of
all positive integers. Let X = RN be the set of all utility streams x = (x1,x2,...).
For all i ∈ N, xi is interpreted as the utility level of the ith generation. For all x ∈ X
and all n ∈ N, we write x−n = (x1,...,xn) and x+n = (xn+1,xn+2,...). For all








denotes a rank-ordered permutation of x−n
such that x
−n
(1) ≤ ··· ≤ x
−n
(n), ties being broken arbitrarily. For all x,y ∈ X, we write
x > y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N, and x > y if x > y and x ̸= y. Negation of a
statement is indicated by the symbol ¬.
A SWR is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation, %, on X. Let ≻ (resp. ∼) be
the asymmetric (resp. symmetric) part of %. A SWR %A is a subrelation of a SWR
%B if (i) x,y ∈ X, x %A y ⇒ x %B y and (ii) x,y ∈ X, x ≻A y ⇒ x ≻B y.
A permutation matrix is an inﬁnite matrix P = (pij)i,j∈N such that (i) for all i ∈ N,
there exists j(i) ∈ N such that pij(i) = 1 and pij = 0 for all j ̸= j(i); and (ii) for all
j ∈ N, there exists i(j) ∈ N such that pi(j)j = 1 and pij = 0 for all i ̸= i(j). Let P be
the set of all permutation matrices. Note that, for all x ∈ X and all P ∈ P, the product
Px = (Px1,Px2,...) belongs to X, where Pxi =
∑
k∈N pikxk for all i ∈ N. For
any P ∈ P, let P ′ be the inverse of P satisfying P ′P = PP ′ = I, where I is the
inﬁnite identity matrix.4 For all P = (pij)i,j∈N ∈ P and all n ∈ N, let P(n) denote
the n×n matrix (pij)i,j∈{1,...,n}. A matrix P = (pij)i,j∈N ∈ P is a ﬁnite permutation
matrix if there exists n ∈ N such that pii = 1 for all i > n. Let F be the set of all ﬁnite
permutation matrices.
Let ei be the stream in X with 1 in the ith place and 0 elsewhere, i.e. the ith unit
vector in X. A permutation P ∈ P is said to be cyclic if, for any i ∈ N, there exists
k(i) ∈ N such that P k(i)ei = ei, where P k(i) denotes the k(i) times iterated multi-
plication of P. Note that if P = (pij)i,j∈N is cyclic then, for all i ∈ N, there exists
4For any P,Q ∈ P, the product PQis deﬁned by (rij)i,j∈N with rij =
P
k∈N pikqkj.
3a k′(i)-dimensional (k′(i) ≤ k(i)) vector (i1,...,ik′(i)) of distinct positive integers
with i1 = i and pi2i1 = ··· = pik′(i)ik′(i)−1 = pi1ik′(i) = 1. While P and F deﬁne a
group with respect to the matrix multiplication, a special class of cyclic permutations
does not (e.g. the class of all cyclic permutations).5
3 Strong impartiality and consequentialist equity
We examine the possibility of a strongly Paretian and equitable SWR that reﬂects im-
partiality stronger than Finite Anonymity. We begin with Strong Pareto and the ex-
tended anonymity called Q-Anonymity. In what follows, let Q be some ﬁxed group of
cyclic permutations with F ⊆ Q ⊆ P.
Strong Pareto (SP): For all x,y ∈ X, if x > y, then x ≻ y.
Q-Anonymity (QA): For all x ∈ X and all P ∈ Q, Px ∼ x.
In the case of Q = F, F-Anonymity is equivalent to Finite Anonymity (FA). When Q
is the class of ﬁxed step permutations Qﬁx = {P ∈ P : there exists k ∈ N such that,
for each n ∈ N, P(nk) is a ﬁnite dimensional permutation matrix}, Qﬁx-Anonymity
corresponds to Fixed Step Anonymity in Lauwers (1997b).6
The following equity axioms formalize the transfer principle due to Pigou (1912)
and Dalton (1920) and the stronger equity principle by Hammond (1976).
Pigou-Dalton Equity (PDE): For all x,y ∈ X, if there exist i,j ∈ N and ϵ ∈ R++
such that xi = yi + ϵ ≤ yj − ϵ = xj and xk = yk for all k ∈ N \ {i,j}, then x ≻ y.
Hammond Equity (HE): For all x,y ∈ X, if there exist i,j ∈ N such that yi < xi ≤
xj < yj and xk = yk for all k ∈ N \ {i,j}, then x ≻ y.
Both two axioms are widely used in the extensive literature on social choice theory,
and we omit a detailed explanation for the sake of brevity.7
We introduce two SWRs satisfying SP, FA and PDE (and HE). For all n ∈ N, let
%n










(i) for all k ∈ {1,...,n}, and let %n
L be
the ﬁnite-horizon leximin SWR on Rn: for all x−n,y−n ∈ Rn, x−n %n
L y−n iff x−n





5For any Q ⊆ P, Q is said to deﬁne a group w.r.t. the matrix multiplication if (i) for all P,Q ∈ Q,
PQ ∈ Q, (ii) there exists I ∈ Q such that for all P ∈ Q, IP = PI = P, (iii) for all P ∈ Q, there
exists P′ ∈ Q such that P′P = PP′ = I, and (iv) for all P,Q,R ∈ Q, (PQ)R = P(QR).
6See also Fleurbaey and Michel (2003), Banerjee (2006a), Lauwers (2006), and Mitra and Basu (2007).
7See d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002) and Bossert and Weymark (2004) as well as Asheim and Tungod-
den (2004) and Bossert et al. (2007). A weaker version of HE is proposed by Asheim and Tungodden (2005)
under the name Hammond Equity for the Future.




(m). The generalized Lorenz and the leximin SWRs, denoted %G
and %L respectively, are deﬁned by: for all x,y ∈ X,
x %G y ⇔ there exists n ∈ N such that x−n %n
G y−n and x+n > y+n; (1)
x %L y ⇔ there exists n ∈ N such that x−n %n
L y−n and x+n > y+n. (2)
Bossert et al. (2007) show that the class of all SWRs that include %G (resp. %L) as a
subrelation is characterized by SP, FA, and PDE (resp. HE) (see Table 1 in Sect. 4).
We now extend the SWRs %G and %L to satisfy QA. For any SWR % on X, deﬁne
the Q-closure of %, denoted %Q, as follows:8 for all x,y ∈ X,
x %Q y ⇔ there exists P ∈ Q such that Px % y. (3)
Let %GQ (resp. %LQ) denote the Q-closure of %G (resp. %L). We call %GQ Q-
generalized Lorenz criterion and %LQ Q-leximin principle. Each of %GQ and %LQ is
well-deﬁned as a SWR on X (see Lemma 1 in Appendix).
The following theorems identify the SWRs satisfying SP, QA and the equity ax-
iom(s).
Theorem 1. Let Q be a group of cyclic permutations with F ⊆ Q ⊆ P. Then, a SWR
% on X satisﬁes SP, QA, and PDE if and only if %GQ is a subrelation of %.
Theorem 2. Let Q be a group of cyclic permutations with F ⊆ Q ⊆ P. Then, a SWR
% on X satisﬁes SP, QA, and HE if and only if %LQ is a subrelation of %.
As discussed by Basu and Mitra (2007) and Banerjee (2006a), Theorem 1 (resp. 2)
tells that %GQ (resp. %LQ) is the minimum element w.r.t. set inclusion among all the
SWRs satisfying the axioms.
4 Q-utilitarian SWR and 2-generation conﬂicts
In this section, we generalize Banerjee’s (2006a) Q-closure of the utilitarian SWR that
is originally deﬁned by Q with F ⊆ Q ⊆ Qﬁx. As shown by Lauwers (2006), Qﬁx
is not maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) within the groups of cyclic permutations. We
reformulate the Q-closure of the utilitarian SWR for Q with F ⊆ Q ⊆ P and provide
two characterizations of it with (i) an equity axiom or (ii) an invariance property.
Let%n






i=1 yi. The utilitarian SWR %U is deﬁned as: for
8The term “Q-closure” is suggested by a referee of this journal. The Q-closure of the Suppes-Sen SWR
and the Qﬁx-closure of the utilitarian SWR are proposed by Mitra and Basu (2007) and Banerjee (2006a)
respectively. See also Lauwers (1997b) and Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) for other Qﬁx-anonymous SWRs.
5all x,y ∈ X,
x %U y ⇔ there exists n ∈ N such that x−n %n
U y−n and x+n > y+n. (4)
Let %UQ denote the Q-closure of %U. We call %UQ Q-utilitarian relation. The
relation %UQ is well-deﬁned as a SWR on X (see Lemma 1 in Appendix).
The following axiom deals with 2-generation conﬂicts similar to PDE and HE.9
Incremental Equity (IE): For all x,y ∈ X, if there exist i,j ∈ N such that xi−yi =
yj − xj and xk = yk for all k ∈ N \ {i,j}, then x ∼ y.
IE asserts that, for any utility transfer between two generations, the pre-transfer utility
stream and the post-transfer stream are equally good. In contrast to PDE, the value
judgment by IE is made without any reference to the relative utility levels of the two
generations. Note that IE implies FA.10
The next proposition characterizes %U with IE.
Proposition 1. A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP and IE if and only if %U is a subrelation
of %.
As shown below, using IE as the resolution to 2-generation conﬂicts, all SWRs
satisfying SP and QA are solely those including %UQ as a subrelation.
Theorem 3. Let Q be a group of cyclic permutations with F ⊆ Q ⊆ P. Then, a SWR
% on X satisﬁes SP, QA, and IE if and only if %UQ is a subrelation of %.
Next, we introduce an invariance axiom employed by Banerjee (2006a).
Partial Translation Scale Invariance (PTSI): For all x,y ∈ X, all α ∈ RN, and all
n ∈ N, if x+n = y+n and x % y, then x + α % y + α.
PTSI is interpreted as saying that utility differences of ﬁnitely many generations are
comparable but utility levels are not.11
The following result generalizes Banerjee’s (2006a) characterization of %UQ to the
case of F ⊆ Q ⊆ P.
Theorem 4. Let Q be a group of cyclic permutations with F ⊆ Q ⊆ P. Then, a SWR
% on X satisﬁes SP, QA, and PTSI if and only if %UQ is a subrelation of %.
9IE was ﬁrst proposed by Blackorby et al. (2002) in a ﬁnite population framework. See also d’Aspremont
and Gevers (2002) and Lemma 2 in Asheim and Tungodden (2004).
10A permutation exchanging only two generations entails utility transfer between them, and any ﬁnite
permutation is represented by a ﬁnite composition of permutations exchanging only two generations.
11For details, see d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002) and Bossert and Weymark (2004). In Basu and Mitra
(2007), PTSI is called Partial Unit Comparability and is used to characterize %U (see Table 1).
6Table 1: Characterizations of F-anonymous SWRs and Q-closures
SWR efﬁciency impartiality equity invariance characterization
(minimum) SP FA QA PDE HE IE PTSI
Q-G-Lorenz ⊕ + ⊕ ⊕ – – Theorem 1
G-Lorenz ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ – – Bossert et al. (2007)
Q-leximin ⊕ + ⊕ + ⊕ – – Theorem 2
































Basu and Mitra (2007)
Table 1 summarizes our ﬁve characterizations and compares them with the related
results by Banerjee (2006a), Basu and Mitra (2007), and Bossert et al. (2007). For
each row in Table 1, the class of SWRs that includes the SWR in the ﬁrst column as a
subrelation is characterized by the axioms indicated by ⊕, and furthermore, each SWR
in the class satisﬁes (resp. violates) the axioms indicated by + (resp. –).
5 Conclusion
We characterized the three classes of strongly Paretian and Q-anonymous SWRs in
terms of PDE, HE and IE. We also generalized Banerjee’s (2006a) characterization of
%UQ to any group Q of cyclic permutations that includes ﬁnite permutations F. For
each theorem, it follows from Arrow’s (1963) variant of Szpilrajn’s (1930) lemma that
there exists an ordering on X satisfying the axioms.12 Thus, in Theorems 1 and 2,
the escape route by Bossert et al. (2007) from the impossibilities of an equitable (and
continuous or representable) ordering (Sakai 2003, 2006; Banerjee 2006b; Hara et al.
2008) is reﬁned with stronger impartiality.
Theorems 1 to 4 are established for an arbitrary group Q of cyclic permutations
with F ⊆ Q ⊆ P, i.e. applicable even to maximal forms of QA. Lauwers (2006)
shows that a maximal group of cyclic permutations involves an ultraﬁlter on the lattice
of partitions of N and is nonconstructive. Consequently, the Qﬁx-closures, which have
explicit descriptions, will be plausible extensions for a practical purpose, though Qﬁx-
Anonymity is not the strongest anonymity consistent with a strongly Paretian SWR.
An issue to be addressed in future work is to test the usefulness of our newly deﬁned
Qﬁx-closures on an intergenerational resource allocation model.
12However, these orderings cannot have an explicit description (Lauwers 2006; Zame 2007).
7Appendix: Proofs
Aﬁnite-horizonSWRisareﬂexiveandtransitivebinaryrelationonaﬁnitedimensional
Euclidean space. We provide two lemmata which are stated for the SWRs deﬁned in
terms of the Pareto criterion and a sequence of ﬁnite-horizon SWRs satisfying the fol-








i for all i ∈ {1,...,n} and
x−n ̸= y−n, then x−n ≻n y−n;
P2: For all n ∈ N, all x−n,y−n ∈ Rn, and all r ∈ R, if x−n %n y−n then
(x−n,r) %n+1 (y−n,r);
P3: For all n ∈ N and all x−n,y−n ∈ Rn, if x−n is a permutation of y−n, then
x−n ∼n y−n.
Let (%n)n∈N be a sequence of ﬁnite-horizon SWRs (one for each time horizon n ∈ N)
satisfying P1 to P3. Deﬁne the binary relation % on X by, for any x,y ∈ X,
x % y ⇔ there exists n ∈ N such that x−n %n y−n and x+n > y+n.13 (5)
As shown in Claim 1 below, the relation % is a SWR on X. Recall that %Q denotes the
Q-closure of %.
We owe a lot to Banerjee’s (2006a) work in establishing the following lemmata.
Lemma 1. %Q is reﬂexive and transitive.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof proceeds through two claims.
Claim 1. The binary relation deﬁned in (5) is reﬂexive and transitive.
Reﬂexivity is obvious. To prove % is transitive, consider any x,y,z ∈ X with
x % y and y % z. By (5), there exist n,n′ ∈ N such that (i) x−n %n y−n and










. Let ¯ n = max{n,n′}. We only
provide the proof for the case of ¯ n = n′. By (i) and P2, (x−n,yn+1,...,y¯ n) %¯ n y−¯ n.
ByP1andreﬂexivity, x−¯ n %¯ n (x−n,yn+1,...,y¯ n), thusx−¯ n %¯ n y−¯ n bytransitivity.
By transitivity, x−¯ n %¯ n z−¯ n. Since x+¯ n > z+¯ n, x % z by (5).
Claim 2. The binary relation deﬁned in (5) satisﬁes the following properties: for any
P ∈ Q and any x,y ∈ X, x % y if and only if Px % Py.
To prove the only-if-part, take any P = (pij)i,j∈N ∈ Q and let x % y. By (5),
there exists n ∈ N such that x−n %n y−n and x+n > y+n. Let ¯ n = max{i ∈
N : pij = 1, j ∈ {1,...,n}}. Deﬁne M by M = {i ∈ {1,..., ¯ n} : pij =
1 for j ∈ {n + 1,n + 2,...}}, and let ˜ i denote the ith smallest number in M. Note
13d’Aspremont (2007) refers to this type of binary relation as simpliﬁed criterion.
8that {x1,...,xn} ⊆ {Px1,...,Px¯ n} for all x ∈ X. Deﬁne w−¯ n,z−¯ n ∈ R¯ n by
(i) w−n = x−n and z−n = y−n and (ii) wn+i = Px˜ i and zn+i = Py˜ i for all
i ∈ {1,..., ¯ n − n}. Since x+n > y+n, w−¯ n %¯ n z−¯ n by P1 and P2. By P3,
w−¯ n ∼¯ n Px−¯ n and z−¯ n ∼¯ n Py−¯ n. By transitivity, Px−¯ n %¯ n Py−¯ n. Since
Px+¯ n > Py+¯ n holds, Px % Py by (5). The if-part is proved by using the inverse
P ′ in the only-if-part.
We now prove Lemma 1. Since I ∈ Q and % is reﬂexive, %Q is reﬂexive. To prove
%Q is transitive, consider x,y,z ∈ X with x %Q y and y %Q z. By (3), there exist
P,Q ∈ Q such that Px % y and Qy % z. By Claim 2, Q(Px) % Qy. Since % is
transitive (by Claim 1), Q(Px) % z. Since QP ∈ Q, x %Q z by (3).
Lemma 2. For any x,y ∈ X,
{
x ≻Q y if and only if there exists P ∈ Q such that Px ≻ y; (6a)
x ∼Q y if and only if there exists P ∈ Q such that Px ∼ y. (6b)
Proof. First, we prove the only-if-part of (6a) by contradiction. Assume x ≻Q y.
By (3), there exists P ∈ Q such that Px % y and ¬(Qy % x) for all Q ∈ Q.
Suppose that there is no P ∈ Q such that Px ≻ y. Then, Px ∼ y. By Claim 2,
x = P ′(Px) ∼ P ′y, which contradicts that ¬(Qy % x) for all Q ∈ Q.
Next, to prove the if-part of (6a), assume that there exists P ∈ Q such that Px ≻
y. By (3), x %Q y. We show ¬(y %Q x) by contradiction. Suppose y %Q x. By
(3), there exists Q ∈ Q such that Qy % x. By Claim 2, P(Qy) % Px. Let R =
(rij)i,j∈N denote the composition PQ. Note that R ∈ Q. By transitivity, Ry ≻ y. By
(5), P1 and P2, two cases are now possible: (i) Ry−n ≻n y−n and Ry+n = y+n for
some n ∈ N or (ii) for some n ∈ N, Ry−n %n y−n and Ry+n > y+n holds with an
inﬁnitenumberofstrictinequality. First, considerthecase(i). Takeanyi ∈ {1,...,n}.
Since R ∈ Q, there exists a ﬁnite dimensional vector (i1,...,ik) of distinct positive
integers with i1 = i and ri2i1 = ··· = rikik−1 = ri1ik = 1. Deﬁne h by h = min{t ∈
{2,...,k} : it ∈ {1,...,n}} if {i2,...,ik} ∩ {1,...,n} ̸= ∅; and h = 1 otherwise.
Since Ry+n = y+n, yi = Ryi2 = yi2 = Ryi3 = ··· = Ryih. Since the number
ih must differ for different i ∈ {1,...,n} (otherwise, R fails to be a permutation
matrix), {Ry1,...,Ryn} = {y1,...,yn}. By P3, Ry−n ∼n y−n, a contradiction.
Next, consider the case (ii). Note that the cardinality of M = {i ∈ N : Ryi > yi}
is inﬁnite. Take any i ∈ M. By the same argument as in the case (i), there exists a
vector (i1,...,ik) of distinct numbers with i1 = i and ri2i1 = ··· = ri1ik = 1. Since
Ryi > yi, Ryj < yj holds for some j ∈ {i2,...,ik}. Applying the same argument
to i′ ∈ M\{i1,...,ik}, we have Ryj′ < yj′ for some j′ with j′ ̸= j. Consequently,
the cardinality of {j ∈ N : Ryj < yj} must be inﬁnite, which contradicts that the
9cardinality of {j ∈ N : Ryj < yj} is at most n − 1.
We now prove the equivalence assertion in (6b). First, assume x ∼Q y. By (3),
there exists P ∈ Q such that Px % y. If Px ≻ y, then x ≻Q y by (6a), which
contradicts x ∼Q y. Thus, Px ∼ y. Next, assume that there exists P ∈ Q such that
Px ∼ y. By Claim 2, x = P ′(Px) ∼ P ′y. Then, by (3), x %Q y and y %Q x, i.e.,
x ∼Q y.
We now provide the proofs of Theorem 1 and Proposition 1. Theorems 2 to 4
are proved by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1 by using the existing
characterization results of %L (by Bossert et al. (2007)) and %U (by Basu and Mitra
(2007)) and Proposition 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of the if-part is easy and omitted. Assume x ≻GQ y.
By (6a), there exists P ∈ Q such that Px ≻G y. Note that, from the characterization
of %G by Bossert et al. (2007), %G is now a subrelation of %. Thus, Px ≻ y. By QA,
x ∼ Px, and x ≻ y by transitivity. Using (6b), the same argument proves that x ∼ y
whenever x ∼GQ y.
Proof of Proposition 1. The if-part is straightforward and omitted. If x ∼U y, then





i=1 yi and x+n = y+n for some n ∈ N (See Lemma 3
in Asheim and Tungodden (2004) and also Theorem 10 in Blackorby et al. (2002)).





and x+n > y+n. Take z ∈ X such that z1 = y1 +
∑n
i=1(xi − yi), zi = yi for all
i ∈ {2,...,n}, and zj = xj for all j ∈ {n + 1,...}. By SP and the implication of IE
stated above, z ≻ y and x ∼ z, thus x ≻ y.
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